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Cover Art
E-RESOURCE
Author Merzoni, Guido S.

Title Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union [electronic resource] / by Guido S. Merzoni.

Published Heidelberg : Physica-Verlag HD : Imprint : Physica, 2003.

Copies

Location Call No. Status
 UniM INTERNET resource    AVAILABLE
Physical description 1 online resource (xii, 147 pages 3 illustrations).
Series Contributions to Economics, 1431-1933
Contributions to economics.
Contents Introduction -- Strategic delegation in firms competing under incomplete information -- Delegation contracts' observability and collusion -- Strategic delegation in the trade union -- Competition for delegates and the evolution of market structure -- Conclusions.
Summary Strategic delegation is a widespread phenomenon in economic and social systems. In many situations the main interested party benefits from appointing a delegate to take action that the principal - were he playing - could not credibly take. This book contributes to the literature studying such a phenomenon, by extending the analysis of its implications for firms' strategy in product markets, by investigating how it may affect the trade union's activity, by studying its dynamic influence on the evolution of strategic interactions that the delegating party is involved in. The welfare effects of strategic delegation turn out to be uncertain and crucially depend on the features of the situation considered, both in static and in dynamic frameworks.
Subject Economics.
Industrial organization (Economic theory)
Electronic books.
ISBN 9783642573323 (electronic bk.)
3642573320 (electronic bk.)
9783790814323
3790814326