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Title Recent developments in monopoly and competition policy [electronic resource] / George Norman.

Published Cheltenham, UK : Edward Elgar, 2008.


Location Call No. Status
Physical description 1 online resource (xxii, 662 p.) : ill. ; cm.
Series The international library of critical writings in economics ; 217
An Elgar reference collection
International library of critical writings in economics ; 217.
Elgar reference collection.
Notes The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references.
Contents Recommended readings (Machine generated): Jonathan B. Baker (2003), 'The Case for Antitrust Enforcement', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17 (4), Fall, 27-50 -- John Vickers (2005), 'Abuse of Market Power', Economic Journal, 115, June, F244-F261 -- Barbara McCutcheon (1997), 'Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (2), April, 330-50 -- David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin (2001), 'Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case', American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 379-98 -- Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell (2001), 'Optimal Collusion with Private Information', RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (3), Autumn, 428-65 -- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2005), 'Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority', International Economic Review, 46 (1), February, 145-69 -- Robert H. Porter and J. Douglas Zona (1999), 'Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding', RAND Journal of Economics, 30 (2), Summer, 263-88 -- John E. Kwoka, Jr. (1997), 'The Price Effects of Bidding Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction "Knockouts"', Antitrust Bulletin, xLII (2), Summer, 503-16 -- John M. Connor (2001), '"Our Customers Are Our Enemies": The Lysine Cartel of 1992-1995', Review of Industrial Organization, 18 (1), February, 5-21 -- Lawrence J. White (2001), 'Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?', Review of Industrial Organization, 18 (1), February, 23-31 -- George Symeonidis (2002), 'Cartel Stability with Multiproduct Firms', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20 (3), March, 339-52 -- Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2006), 'What Determines Cartel Success?', Journal of Economic Literature, xLIv (1), March, 43-95 -- Massimo Motta and Michele Polo (2003), 'Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (3), March, 347-79 -- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), 'Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis', American Economic Review, 80 (1), March, 107-26 -- David Spector (2003), 'Horizontal Mergers, Entry, and Efficiency Defences', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (10), December, 1591-600 -- Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason and Daniel S. Hosken (2006), 'Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples ', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 13 (2), July, 265-79 -- Dario Focarelli and Fabio Panetta (2003), 'Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Market for Bank Deposits', American Economic Review, 93 (4), September, 1152-72 -- Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure', American Economic Review, 80 (1), March, 127-42 -- Yongmin Chen (2001), 'On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects', RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (4), Winter, 667-85
Margaret E. Slade (1998), 'Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?', Economic Journal, 108 (448), May, 565-602 -- B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1998), 'Exclusive Dealing', Journal of Political Economy, 106 (1), February, 64-103 -- Michael D. Whinston (2001), 'Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (2), Spring, 63-80 -- Tim R. Sass (2005), 'The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (3-4), April, 203-25 -- Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills (2001), 'Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory', Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 2475-94 -- Barry Nalebuff (2004), 'Bundling as an Entry Barrier', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (1), February, 159-87 -- Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), 'The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries', RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (2), Summer, 194-220 -- Leemore S. Dafny (2005), 'Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14 (3), Fall, 513-42
Summary Competition policy aims to prevent anticompetitive agreements and mergers, limiting the abusive exercise of market power. The formulation and application of this policy presents significant challenges, which include showing that proposed mergers are anticompetitive, proving that firms are members of cartels and defending apparently restrictive vertical agreements. For this insightful volume the editor has selected key papers which illustrate how far we have come towards meeting these challenges. They provide comprehensive developmental coverage of the theory that underpins and justifies competition policy, and of the econometric tests that demonstrate its effects and violations. This timely book will be an invaluable resource to researchers and practitioners alike with an interest in this important subject.
Other author Norman, George, 1946-
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Subject Monopolies.
Competition -- Government policy.
Electronic books.
ISBN 9781785366826 (e-book)