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PRINTED BOOKS
Author Unger, Peter K., author.

Title Empty ideas : a critique of analytic philosophy / Peter Unger.

Published Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2014]
©2014.

Copies

Location Call No. Status
 UniM Bail  110 UNGE    AVAILABLE
Physical description xiv, 258 pages ; 25 cm
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 247-254) and index.
Contents 1 How Empty is Mainstream Philosophy? 1 -- 1 Most Recent Mainstream Proposals Are Concretely Empty Ideas 4 -- 2 A Working Idea of Concrete Reality 10 -- 3 Observing the Concretely Empty in Some Recent Mainstream Philosophy 11 -- 4 Our Central Distinction and Three That Have Been Philosophically Salient 16 -- 5 Concretely Empty the Analytically Empty and Mainstream Philosophy 20 -- 2 Promising Examples of Concretely Substantial Philosophy 25 -- 1 Some Pretty Promising Examples of Concretely Substantial Philosophy 25 -- 2 Substantial Scientiphicalism of Mainstream Philosophy 31 -- 3 Memory, History and Emptiness 36 -- 4 Various Specifications of Scientiphicalism and Various Departures from Scientiphicalism 39 -- 5 Interactionist Entity Dualism and the Problem of Causal Pairings 42 -- 6 Exploring Philosophical Thoughts that May Be Analytically Empty Ideas 46 -- 3 Thinkers and What They Can Think About: Empty Issues and Individualistic Powers 47 -- 1 Language, Thought and History 49 -- 2 Thinking about "The External World" 55 -- 3 Earth, Twin Earth and History 60 -- 4 Banality of" Successfully Investigating Unfamiliar Individuals 65 -- 5 A Concretely Substantial Possibility: Individualistically Directed Powers 68 -- 6 Propensity to Acquire Individualistic Powers and Its Historical Manifestation 70 -- 7 A Concretely Substantial Possibility: Individualistically Directed Mental Powers 73 -- 8 Generalistic Propensities to Acquire Real-kind Directed Mental Powers 75 -- 9 Wishful Blindness to Emptiness: Putnam's "Transcendental" Pronouncement 76 -- 10 Reading Modal Claims Substantially and Widening Our Philosophical Horizons 78 -- 4 Origins of Material Individuals: Empty Issues and SEQU Entialistic Powers 81 -- 1 Origin of a Particular Wooden Table 83 -- 2 Some Thoughts about Tables and Some Thoughts about Shmables 86 -- 3 Origination Conditions, Persistence Conditions, and Boxing a Logical Compass 89 -- 4 A Tenet of Scientiphicalism: Basic Individuals Have No "Memory-like" Propensity 91 -- 5 How a Wooden Table Could Have First Been Made from a Hunk of Ice 94 -- 6 Tood and Ticc, a Table First Made of Wood and a Table First Made of Ice 97 -- 7 Using Modal Terms Substantially: The Case of Determinism 99 -- 8 Distinctive Material Objects and These Objects' Distinctive Matter 100 -- 9 Sequentialistically Propensitied Concrete Particulars 104 -- 10 Wooden Tables, Ice, and Sequentialistically Propensitied Concrete Particulars 106 -- 5 Persistence of Material Individuals: Empty Issues and Self-Directed Propensity 109 -- 1 Material Sculptures and Pieces of Matter 109 -- 2 Are There Inconveniently Persisting Material Individuals? 114 -- 3 Pieces, Lumps and Hunks: A Problematic Plethora of Persisting Individuals? 118 -- 4 Is There a Plethora of Extraordinary Persisting Individuals? 120 -- 5 Ordinary and Not So Ordinary Persisting Material Individuals 122 -- 6 Using These Sentences Differently and Expressing Substantial Ideas 125 -- 7 Fundamentals of Fundamental Material Persistents 129 -- 6 Empty Debates about Material Matters 134 -- 1 Matter Distributed Particulately but Not Even a Single Material Individual? 136 -- 2 Matter Distributed Particulately, but Only a Single Material Individual? 137 -- 3 Matter and Material Objects: Salient Positions on Empty Questions 138 -- 4 Debate about Complex Material Individuals 139 -- 5 An Exploration of the Salient Debate: Popular Paraphrases, Problematic Parallels 143 -- 6 Complex Material Individuals and Arrangements of Simple Material Individuals 145 -- 7 Mereological Sums of Simple Material Individuals: Fusions, Fusions Everywhere 146 -- 8 Sums of Simple Physical Entities and Complex Ordinary Material Individuals 149 -- 9 Four Distinct Sorts of Spatial Inhabitants: Material Mereological Sums, Material Arrangements, Complex Material Objects, and (Complex) Ordinary Individuals 150 -- Worldy Appendix 156 -- Are There Any Concrete Worlds, Including Even the Actual World? 156 -- 7 Individuals, Properties and Time: A Few Substantial Thoughts and Many Empty Ideas 160 -- 1 Are There Really Any Properties or Are There Only AH the Propertied Individuals? 162 -- 2 Temporal, the Empty and the Substantial: First Part 170 -- 3 Temporal, the Empty and the Substantial: Second Part 175 -- 4 Is There a Real Need That Properties (Alone) Suitably Serve? First Part 179 -- 5 Is There a Real Need That Properties (Alone) Suitably Serve? Second Part 182 -- 8 What Will Become of Us: Empty Issues and Substantial Speculations 187 -- 1 Locke's Proposed Persons 190 -- 2 Locke's Lame Legacy 192 -- 3 Beyond Locke, but Not beyond Philosophical Thoughts Both Incorrect and Empty 197 -- 4 So-Called Commonseusical Materialism 202 -- 5 So-Called Commonscnsical Materialism and the Mental Problems of the Many 204 -- 6 Might You Be a Quite Simple Physical Thing? If So, What Will Become of You? 208 -- 7 Articulating Our Argument for a Substantial Dualist View of Ourselves 211 -- 8 How an Immaterial Soul May, or May Not, Survive the Death of Its Body 215 -- 9 If We Should Become Disembodied Souls, Will We Be Experiencing Souls? 216 10. If We Become Experiencing Disembodied Souls, Will We Be Fortunate Souls? 218 -- 9 When Will There Be Some Serious New Substantial Philosophy? 223 -- 1 Concretely Substantial Ideas about Mutually Isolated Concrete Worlds: First Part 225 -- 2 Concretely Substantial Ideas about Mutually Isolated Concrete Worlds: Second Part 231 -- 3 Some Substantial Philosophical Thoughts about Actual Concrete Reality 234 -- 4 Scientific Philosophers and Serious New Substantial Philosophy 239 -- 5 Philosophy May Mine and Refine What Even the Most Ambitious Sciences Produce 240 -- 6 Concrete Reality and Modest Philosophy 243.
Subject Reality.
Substance (Philosophy)
Matter -- Philosophy.
Analysis (Philosophy)
ISBN 9780199330812 (hardback : alk. paper)
0199330816 (hardback : alk. paper)