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Book Cover
PRINTED BOOKS
Author Vohra, Rakesh V.

Title Mechanism design : a linear programming approach / Rakesh V. Vohra.

Published Cambridge, [UK] ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Copies

Location Call No. Status
 UniM Giblin Eunson  658.4033 VOHR    AVAILABLE
Physical description x, 172 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
Series Econometric Society monographs ; 47.
Econometric Society monographs ; no. 47.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 165-169) and index.
Contents 1 Introduction 1 -- 1.1 Outline 5 -- 2 Arrow's Theorem and Its Consequences 7 -- 2.1 Integer Program 8 -- 2.2 Social Choice Functions 14 -- 2.3 Mechanisms and Revelation 20 -- 3 Network Flow Problem 24 -- 3.1 Graphs 24 -- 3.2 Network Flow Problem 26 -- 3.3 Flow Decomposition 30 -- 3.4 Shortest-Path Polyhedron 33 -- 4 Incentive Compatibility 38 -- 4.1 Notation 38 -- 4.2 Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility 40 -- 4.3 Revenue Equivalence 59 -- 4.4 Classical Approach 69 -- 4.5 Interdependent Values 73 -- 4.6 Bayesian Incentive Compatibility 77 -- 5 Efficiency 79 -- 5.1 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism 79 -- 5.2 Combinatorial Auctions 82 -- 5.3 Core 87 -- 5.4 Ascending Auctions 89 -- 5.5 Gross Substitutes 105 -- 5.6 An Impossibility 107 -- 5.7 A Recipe 109 -- 6 Revenue Maximization 110 -- 6.1 What Is a Solution? 112 -- 6.2 One-Dimensional Types 114 -- 6.3 Budget Constraints 135 -- 6.4 Asymmetric Types 140 -- 6.5 Multidimensional Types 141 -- 7 Rationalizability 160 -- 7.1 Quasilinear Case 160 -- 7.2 General Case 161.
Summary "Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design"-- Provided by publisher.
Subject Decision making -- Linear programming.
Organizational behavior -- Mathematical models.
Machine theory.
ISBN 9781107004368 (hbk.)
1107004365 (hbk.)
9780521179461 (paperback)
0521179467 (paperback)