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E-RESOURCE
Author Enthoven, Alain C.

Title How Much Is Enough? : Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969.

Published Santa Monica : RAND Corp., 2007.

Copies

Location Call No. Status
 UniM INTERNET resource    AVAILABLE
Physical description 1 online resource (395 pages)
Series Books at JSTOR Open Access
Notes Originally published in 1971, and now published with a new foreword, this is a book of enduring value and lasting relevance. The authors detail the application, history, and controversies surrounding the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), used to evaluate military needs and to choose among alternatives for meeting those needs.
Contents Unfinished business, 1961 -- New concepts and new tools to shape the defense program -- Why independent analysts? -- NATO strategy and forces -- Nuclear strategy and forces -- Yardsticks of sufficiency -- Three controversial program decisions -- Some problems in wartime defense management -- Unfinished business, 1969.
Cover; Introduction to the New Edition; Foreword to the New Edition; Preface; Contents; Tables; Chapter 1 -- Unfinished Business, 1961; Chapter 2 -- New Concepts and New Tools to Shape the Defense Program; Chapter 3 -- Why Independent Analysts?; Chapter 4 -- NATO Strategy and Forces; Chapter 5 -- Nuclear Strategy and Forces; Chapter 6 -- Yardsticks of Sufficiency; Chapter 7 -- Three Controversial Program Decisions; Source Notes; Index; About the Authors.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 339-348) and index.
Summary A work of enduring value and lasting relevance, this book is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the Department of Defense (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort. Robert S. McNamara took office in 1961 convinced that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the services, should control the evaluation of military needs and should choose among alternatives for meeting those needs. His device was a new system for allocating defense resources, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), whic.
Language notes English.
Other author JSTOR issuing body.
Subject United States. Department of Defense -- History -- 20th century.
Military planning -- United States -- History -- 20th century.
United States -- Armed Forces -- Management -- History -- 20th century.
United States -- Armed Forces -- Cost control -- History -- 20th century.
Electronic books.
History.
ISBN 9780833048141 (electronic bk.)
0833048147 (electronic bk.)
1282451278
9781282451278