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Cover Art
Author Kletzer, Kenneth.

Title Sovereign Bond Restructuring [electronic resource] : Collective Action Clauses and official Crisis Intervention / Kenneth Kletzer.

Published Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2003.


Location Call No. Status
Physical description 1 online resource (25 p.)
Series IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 03/134
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 03/134
Summary This paper compares the restructuring of sovereign bonds with and without collective action clauses. One conclusion is that collective action clauses can allow efficient debt renegotiation in a formal model of sovereign debt renegotiation while unanimity rules offer incentives for opportunistic behavior by bondholders that leads to inefficient outcomes. With collective action clauses, the mutual gains from renegotiation can be internalized by bondholders so that the holders of each bond issue have incentives to participate in a collective debt restructuring. The analysis abstracts from transactions costs, and the last conclusion might well be sensitive to renegotiation and coordination costs.
Notes Description based on print version record.
Other author Kletzer, Kenneth.
Subject Bond
Debt Renegotiation
International Economic Order
International Financial Architecture
ISBN 1451855621 : 15.00 USD
ISSN 1018-5941
Standard Number 10.5089/9781451855623.001