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Cover Art
E-RESOURCE
Author Eggertsson, Gauti B.

Title A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence [electronic resource] / Gauti B Eggertsson.

Published Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2003.

Copies

Location Call No. Status
 UniM INTERNET resource    AVAILABLE
Physical description 1 online resource (44 p.)
Series IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 03/144
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 03/144
Summary We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
Notes Description based on print version record.
Other author Eggertsson, Gauti B.
Le Borgne, Eric.
Subject Average Inflation
Career Concerns
Central Bank Independece
Central Bank
Elections
Experimentation
ISBN 1451856466 : 15.00 USD
9781451856460
ISSN 1018-5941
Standard Number 10.5089/9781451856460.001