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Author Keefer, Philip.

Title When do special interests run rampant? [electronic resource] : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises / Philip Keefer.

Published Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.


Location Call No. Status
Series Policy research working paper ; 2543
Policy research working papers ; 2543.
World Bank e-Library.
Notes "February 2001"--Cover.
Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 18, 2002.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-47).
Summary Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interest groups, especially government decisions to deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number of political veto players (conditional on the costs to voters of relevant policy decisions), the smaller the government's fiscal transfers are to the financial sector and the less likely the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions.
Other formats Also available in print.
Other author World Bank. Development Research Group. Regulation and Competition Policy.
Subject Banks and banking -- Political aspects -- Mathematical models.
Financial crises -- Mathematical models.
Fiscal policy -- Mathematical models.