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Author Keefer, Philip.

Title Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments [electronic resource] / Philip Keefer, David Stasavage.

Published Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, [2001]


Location Call No. Status
Series Policy research working paper ; 2542
Policy research working papers ; 2542.
World Bank e-Library.
Notes Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 19, 2002.
Summary In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies.
Other formats Also available in print.
Other author Stasavage, David.
World Bank. Development Research Group. Regulation and Competition Policy.
Subject Banks and banking, Central.
Inflation (Finance)