| Edition |
1st ed. |
| Physical description |
166 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm. |
| Series |
Oxford series in ecology and evolution. |
|
Oxford series in ecology and evolution.
|
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 141-159) and index. |
| Contents |
1.2 Signals and cues 3 -- 1.3 Problem of reliability 6 -- 1.4 Forms of signals 9 -- 1.5 Action-response games, and some alternatives 11 -- 1.6 Sexual selection 12 -- 1.7 Definitions and terminology 15 -- 2 Theory of costly signalling 16 -- 2.2 A brief history of the handicap principle 17 -- 2.3 Philip Sidney game 20 -- 2.4 'Pooling equilibria'--a more radical proposal 27 -- 2.5 Non-signalling equilibria 29 -- 2.6 Must honest signals always be costly? 29 -- 3 Strategic signals and minimal-cost signals 32 -- 3.2 Strategic signals 33 -- 3.3 Minimal-cost signals 37 -- 4 Indices of quality 45 -- 4.2 Are mammalian sounds reliable indices of size? 45 -- 4.3 Evolution of indices 47 -- 4.4 Indices in different contexts 48 -- 4.5 Indices and handicaps 60 -- 4.6 Some problem cases 61 -- 5 Evolution of signal form 68 -- 5.1 Ritualization 68 -- 5.2 Efficacy 73 -- 5.3 Arms races, manipulation and sensory bias 74 -- 5.4 Sensory manipulation 81 -- 5.5 Mimicry and cheating 86 -- 6 Signals during contests 90 -- 6.2 Badges of status 92 -- 6.3 Can signals of need settle contests? 96 -- 6.4 Punishment 99 -- 6.5 Protracted contests and varied signals 100 -- 7 Signals in primates and other social animals 112 -- 7.2 Vervet Monkeys: a case study 113 -- 7.3 How does the ability to signal develop? 116 -- 7.4 Questions about what is going on in an animal's head 118 -- 7.5 Social reputation and the honesty of signals 121 -- 7.6 Emotional commitment 124 -- 7.7 Human language 130. |
| Other author |
Harper, David, Dr.
|
| Subject |
Animal communication.
|
| ISBN |
0198526857 (paperback: alkaline paper) |
|
0198526849 (hardback : alkaline paper) |
|
