| Physical description |
x, 173 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 155-164) and index. |
| Contents |
Ch. 1. The Debate on Predation -- Ch. 2. Reputational Models of Predation: Testing the Assumptions -- Ch. 3. Nonprofit Objectives and Credible Commitments: What Does This Imply for Government Enterprises? -- Ch. 4. Are Government or Private Enterprises More Likely to Engage in Predatory Behavior? Some International Evidence -- Ch. 5. What Happens When the Victims Have Better Information Than the Predators? -- Ch. 6. Some Final Thoughts -- App. A. Explaining the Framework Used to Evaluate the Legitimacy of Anti-dumping Cases -- App. B. Data Appendix -- App. C. Analyzing How the Profitability of Entry Deterrence Is Affected by the Possibility of Trading Profits. |
| Summary |
In Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? John Lott provides long-awaited empirical analysis of predatory pricing. By examining firms accused of or convicted of predation over a thirty-year period, he shows that these firms are not organized as game-theoretic or other models of predation would predict. In contrast, what evidence exists for predation suggests that government enterprises are more of a threat and are more likely to engage in predatory behavior than private firms. This work will be of great interest to economists, legal scholars, and antitrust policy makers. |
| Subject |
Predatory pricing -- United States.
|
|
Antitrust law -- United States.
|
| ISBN |
0226493555 (cloth : alkaline paper) |
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